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While the corporate bankruptcy regime of the United States provides for 
a  so-called  debtor-oriented  regime,  many  European  corporate 
bankruptcy regimes could hitherto be labeled as creditor-oriented. Yet 
bankruptcy  reform  in  Europe  generally  emphasizes  the  need  for 
introducing schemes that facilitate business rescue, which has already 
led  several  European  countries  to  add  reorganization  mechanisms  to 
their bankruptcy laws. Surprisingly, at either side of the Atlantic, policy 
makers  pay  little  attention  to  corporate  bankruptcy  as  a  corporate 
governance  mechanism.  This  paper  argues  that  the  comparative 
efficiency  of  corporate  bankruptcy  regimes  cannot  be  considered 
separate from the governance structures of firms that make use of the 
bankruptcy  laws.  To  evidence  this,  the  paper  analyzes  two  types  of 
governance structures, namely that of the small and medium-sized firm 
with a concentrated secured bank lender and that of the publicly-held 
firm with a dispersed ownership structure. This account gives rise to a 
reformulation  of  the  tradeoffs  made  by  debtor-  and  creditor-oriented 
regimes  and  suggests  that  different  optimal  regimes  may  exist  for 
different types of firms. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Within  the  European  Union  (EU),  many  Member  States  have  either 
promulgated or are still in the process of considering the introduction of 
procedures designed to facilitate business reorganization. In the main, 
the reasons stated for adding reorganization regimes to the insolvency 
laws
1 are the low recoveries of unsecured creditors in bankruptcy and the 
barriers that secured creditors’ powers in bankruptcy form to successful 
reorganization efforts. At the EU level, in turn, the desire to become the 
most competitive economy
2 has led to initial investigations into the role 
                                                       
 
1  The terms ‘insolvency law’, ‘bankruptcy law’, and ‘corporate bankruptcy law’ 
will be used interchangeably throughout this paper. Consideration of issues facing the 
entrepreneur-individual who experiences insolvency problems is outside the scope of this 
paper. 
 
2  See European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions: Lisbon European Council 23 








bankruptcy law could play in fostering entrepreneurship and innovation. 
Here  the  emphasis  is,  in  the  first  place,  on  offering  entrepreneurs  a 
second chance, although both the recent calls within the EU for assessing 
national  bankruptcy  laws  and  the  reports  commissioned  by  and 
submitted to the European Commission (EC) do not make a sharp divide 
between  the  role of bankruptcy law  in fostering entrepreneurship  and 
innovation, on the one hand, and promoting business rescue regimes in 
general, on the other hand.
3 As a consequence, the best procedure project 
launched by the Commission in 2002 appears targeted more generally at 
inspiring  the  Member  States  toward  maintaining  an  institutional 
framework conducive to business rescue. 
Unsurprisingly,  the  high  level  of  discord  in  many  jurisdictions, 
concerning the functioning of the extant corporate bankruptcy laws, has 
influenced and structured the direction of the debate. In the United States 
(US), for instance, criticism of the debtor-oriented reorganization regime 
has led some critics to recommend a repeal of Chapter 11. Moreover, 
while some commentators have advocated the introduction of an auction 
or  contingent  equity  scheme,  others  defend  a  contract  approach  to 
corporate bankruptcy law. In many European countries, dissatisfaction 
with  the  creditor-oriented  bankruptcy  regimes  has  prompted  both 
bankruptcy  scholars  and  lawmakers  to  consider  the  inclusion  of 
reorganization procedures in their national bankruptcy laws. 
To date, policy-makers on either side of the Atlantic have paid very 
little attention to bankruptcy as a corporate governance mechanism. This 
is all the more surprising if one considers that bankruptcy essentially is 
about  control  over  a  corporation’s  assets.  Consequently,  the  question 
regarding to which party control should be ceded in bad states of the 
world  is  a  fundamental  issue  of  corporate  bankruptcy  law.  Viewing 
corporate bankruptcy law as a corporate governance mechanism means 
                                                                                                                        
<http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=60917&from=&LANG=1> 
(last visited 13 August 2004). 
 
3  Philippe & Partners, Deloitte & Touche Corporate Finance, Bankruptcy and a 
Fresh Start: Stigma on Failure and Legal Consequences of Bankruptcy, (Brussels, July 
2002);  European  Commission,  Enterprise  Directorate  General,  Best  Project  on 
Restructuring,  Bankruptcy  and  a  Fresh  Start,  Final  Report  of  the  Expert  Group 








linking the function of bankruptcy law to the governance structures of 
specific  firms.  Within  the  governance  structures  of  firms,  debt 
structure—the very reason that firms go bankrupt—fulfils a pivotal role. 
Different  debt  structures  correlate  to  different  governance  problems 
within firms.
4 When drafting reform proposals bankruptcy policy makers 
should,  therefore,  take  into  account  the  role  that  debt  fulfils  in  the 
governance of firms. Disregarding the role of debt structure comes with 
the  risk  that  reform  proposals  may  be  misguided.  For  instance,  an 
assumption underlying many of the recent bankruptcy reforms in Europe 
is the view that secured debt, and in particular concentrated secured debt, 
is both an obstacle to business reorganization and a reason for the low 
recoveries of unsecured creditors in bankruptcy. However, this reform 
approach denies the important monitoring, screening and bonding role 
that concentrated secured debt may play in the governance of firms. In 
the  United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  skepticism  regarding  the 
functioning  of  Chapter  11,  with  respect  to  large  publicly-held  firms, 
overlooks the beneficial role that Chapter 11 may play in fostering an ex 
post efficient reallocation of control where capital structures of firms do 
not provide for an ex ante mechanism to reallocate control. 
This paper suggests that bankruptcy regimes function efficiently to 
the extent that they complement the specific governance characteristics 
of  firms.  The  upshot  is  that  neither  the  debtor-oriented  nor  creditor-
oriented regime of corporate bankruptcy law, when considered separate 
from firm characteristics, is clearly the more efficient regime. Moreover, 
it  follows  that  neither  of  the  regimes  is  the  more  optimal  one  in  an 
absolute sense. Thus, considering the governance structures of specific 
firms, this paper articulates the view that different optimal regimes may 
exist for different firms. Consequently, a bankruptcy regime may have a 
comparative advantage if it is more responsive than other regimes to the 
governance  mechanisms  at  work  in  firms.  Section  2  recounts  several 
important tenets of the economic approach to corporate bankruptcy law, 
describes the distinction between creditor- and debtor-oriented corporate 
                                                       
4 J. Armour et al. ‘Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: 
Lessons from the United Kingdom’, 55 Vanderbilt Law Review (2002) p. 1699, at pp. 








bankruptcy regimes, and delineates the characterization of the efficiency 
tradeoffs made by these regimes. 
Section 3 then turns to assess the implications of viewing corporate 
bankruptcy  as  a  governance  mechanism.  It  suggests  that  the  initial 
characterization, elaborated in Section 2, falls well short of explaining 
the respective tradeoffs of the two main corporate bankruptcy regimes. 
By neglecting to consider the impact of different governance structures 
on the functioning of corporate bankruptcy laws and by not including 
law-in-action  in  the  analysis,  they  do  not  offer  a  sufficiently 
comprehensive picture required to assess the comparative advantages of 
these regimes. To evidence that the efficient functioning of corporate 
bankruptcy  law  cannot  be  considered  separate  from  the  governance 
structures of firms, this section discusses the small and medium-sized 
business  with  concentrated  debt  and  equity  structures,  and  the  large, 
publicly-held firm with a dispersed ownership structure.  
The analysis draws on the incomplete contracts and property rights 
approaches to the firm. Central to this analysis is the extent to which 
capital structures of firms provide for an ex ante mechanism to transfer 
the residual right of control in bad states of the world or, instead, are 
incomplete  in  that  they  do  not,  and  cannot,  provide  for  such  a 
mechanism from an ex ante time perspective. It is suggested that the 
capital structure of the small and medium-sized business assigns ex ante 
a contingent residual right of control to the concentrated secured bank 
lender. As a consequence, the role of bankruptcy law is to confirm the 
residual  right  of  control  of  the  relational  bank  lender.  The  capital 
structure of the prototypical publicly-held firm, in turn, fails to make an 
ex  ante  assignment  of  the  contingent  right  of  control.  The  role  of 
bankruptcy law, then, is to offer for an ex post mechanism that facilitates 
the transfer of the residual right of control. 
  Section 4 moves on to argue that amending creditor-oriented regimes 
with measures designed to enhance the reorganization possibilities for 
SMEs  may  not  be  warranted.  It  suggests,  moreover,  that  a  debtor-
oriented  regime  does  not  necessarily  weaken  the  management 
disciplining effects of concentrated relational lenders, provided that it is 








businesses. On the other hand, with respect to publicly-held firms with 
dispersed ownership structures this section proposes that repealing the 
open-ended  debtor-oriented  regime  and  replacing  it  by  a  more  rigid 
bankruptcy regime could potentially impede the efficient reallocation of 
control ex post. Section 5 concludes by arguing that creditor- and debtor-
oriented  regimes  essentially  offer  optimal  bankruptcy  regimes  for 
different types of firms, and identifies a number of research questions 
that arise as a consequence of the analysis presented in this paper. 
2.  AN  ECONOMIC  APPROACH  TO  CORPORATE  BANKRUPTCY 
LAW 
The reduction of bankruptcy costs is the main concern of the economic 
approach to bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy costs are divided in direct and 
indirect costs. Direct costs are such costs as filing and professional fees 
incurred by the bankrupt firm. Indirect costs come in two types. First, 
bankrupt firms incur costs because its business operations are hampered 
due  to  a  loss  of  suppliers,  customers  and  key  personnel.  Second, 
bankruptcy  law  imposes  costs  on  the  firm  by  evoking  suboptimal 
investment  incentives  among  the  firm’s  managers,  shareholders  and 
creditors. This second type of indirect costs is generally perceived as the 
more important source of costs. 
  By focusing on this second type of indirect bankruptcy costs, the law-
and-economics approach to corporate bankruptcy law largely builds on 
the major tenets of the principal-agent theory of the firm. The principal-
agent theory provides for an integrated  explanation of the managerial 
agency  costs  associated  with,  on  the  one  hand,  the  separation  of 
ownership and control and, on the other hand, the division of ownership 
among  the  firm’s  shareholders  and  creditors.
5  Bankruptcy  law’s 
provisions that affect the distribution to creditors and shareholders, as 
well  as  those that  affect  the  control over the distressed firm’s assets, 
evoke agency costs in the form of over-investment and under-investment 
incentives among the firm’s shareholders, creditors and managers prior 
                                                       
 
5  See M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling, ‘The Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 








to (ex ante) as well as after (ex post) the start of a bankruptcy procedure. 
Over-investment occurs if the company invests in projects that reduce 
firm  value,  whereas  under-investment  occurs  if  the  company  fails  to 
invest in projects that would have increased firm value. From a law-and-
economics perspective, the aim of bankruptcy policymaking should be to 
reduce the ex ante and ex post suboptimal investment incentives created 
by corporate bankruptcy law in order to enhance the value of the firm’s 
assets. 
  A bankruptcy regime is ex post efficient if it reduces over-investment 
and  under-investment  during  a  bankruptcy  procedure.  In  general,  a 
bankruptcy regime is ex post efficient if it timely closes economically 
distressed firms, whereas it leads to the continuance of firms that are 
economically efficient but financially distressed. However, information 
asymmetry  between  managers  and  investors  and  uncertainty  on  the 
firm’s  value  may  lead  to  suboptimal  asset  deployment  decisions.  A 
fundamental aim of corporate bankruptcy law, therefore, is to provide for 
mechanisms that reduce information asymmetry and uncertainty on the 
firm’s value in order to ascertain that the assets are put to their highest-
valued use. 
  A bankruptcy regime is ex ante efficient if it fosters desirable risk 
taking by managers and shareholders in general, while at the same time it 
reduces the chance of over-investment and under-investment by all firms 
within an economy. This first measure of ex ante efficiency considers the 
impact  of  bankruptcy  regimes  on  the  efforts  of  entrepreneurs  and 
managers as well as on the costs of capital for firms. Furthermore, in 
order  to  be  ex  ante  efficient  a  bankruptcy  regime  should  induce 
financially distressed firms to timely turn around their economic and/or 
financial  distress  by  divesting  their  assets  or  restructuring  their  debts 
either inside or outside of bankruptcy. This second measure of ex ante 
efficiency  considers  the  impact  of  bankruptcy  regimes  on  over-
investment and under-investment once a firm is in financial distress. 
2.1  Creditor- and Debtor-Oriented Bankruptcy Regimes 
Corporate  bankruptcy  regimes  are  generally  divided  into  ‘creditor-
oriented’ or ‘hard’ and ‘debtor-oriented’ or ‘soft’ regimes on the basis of 








bankruptcy  regime  is  characterized  as  creditor-oriented  if  it  replaces 
management for a court-appointed trustee (‘hard’ on management) and it 
does not provide for a complete stay of the creditors’ enforcement rights, 
but permits senior secured creditors to enforce their claims against the 
debtor’s  assets.  As  a  consequence,  business  continuation  during 
bankruptcy is an unlikely event. The applicable distributive rule is the 
absolute  priority  rule,  meaning  that  the  distribution  to  creditors  and 
shareholders should follow the priority ranking outside of bankruptcy. 
The limited automatic stay and the application of the absolute priority 
rule  make  that  the  bankruptcy  regime  emphasizes  the  protection  of 
creditors’ ex ante bargained for rights. On the other hand, a corporate 
bankruptcy regime is characterized as debtor-oriented if it provides for a 
reorganization procedure that leaves management in place as the debtor-
in-possession (‘soft’ on managers), and it offers a complete stay of the 
creditors’ enforcement rights. Even though liquidation is an option under 
a  debtor-oriented  regime,  the  manager-friendly  character  and  the 
complete stay make firm continuation in bankruptcy an attractive option 
to  the  managers.  The  applicable  distributive  rule  in  reorganization  is 
loss-sharing,  meaning  that  creditors  and  shareholders  are  allowed  to 
agree on a distribution that deviates from the priority ranking outside of 
bankruptcy. A debtor-oriented regime is thus said to place less emphasis 
on the protection of the creditors’ ex ante bargained for rights. 
  The description of the debtor-oriented regime is clearly based on the 
main characteristics of Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. Upon 
filing for Chapter 11 virtually all creditors’ enforcement rights, including 
the rights of the secured creditors, are stayed.
6 During the procedure the 
debtor’s  management  stays  in  place  as  the  debtor-in-possession  and 
continues to run the debtor’s business operations
7 subject to the oversight 
of the bankruptcy judge and an unsecured creditors’ committee.
8 During 
the  first  120  days  of  the  procedure  the  debtor-in-possession  has  the 
                                                       
 
6   11 USC s. 362. 
 
7   In order to do so the debtor-in-possession has the power to use, sell and lease 
property of the estate (11 USC s. 363), to incur new loans (11 USC s. 364), and to 
unilaterally assume or reject executory contracts (11 USC s. 365). 
 
8   Appointment of an unsecured creditors’ committee is mandatory, see 11 USC 








exclusive  right  to  propose  a  reorganization  plan  to  the  firm’s 
shareholders  and  creditors.
9  Chapter  11  aims  at  the  formulation  of  a 
reorganization  plan  that  distributes  the  firm’s  value  among  its 
shareholders  and  creditors.  The  bankruptcy  judge  has  to  confirm  the 
reorganization  plan  if  all  the  classes  that  are  entitled  to  vote  have 
accepted  the  plan.
10  This  implies  that  shareholders  and  creditors  can 
consensually deviate from the absolute priority rule. If not all classes 
entitled to vote have accepted the plan, the bankruptcy court can ‘cram-
down’ the plan against a dissenting class if it is fair and equitable toward 
such a class, that is, if such class is paid in full or the classes ranking 
below the dissenting class do not receive any payment.
11 Thus, the cram-
down  provisions  reinstate  the  absolute  priority  rule  with  respect  to 
dissenting classes. Stated differently, it prescribes ‘relative’ priority. 
  Even  though  many  European  lawmakers  have  moved  to  include 
reorganization procedures in their insolvency laws, none of the laws can 
be classified as being debtor-oriented. None have a debtor-in-possession 
system similar to that of Chapter 11. For instance, they generally do not 
embrace a loss-sharing rule, or the stay of creditors’ enforcement rights 
is often more restricted either in time or in scope. 
  Until  recently,  the  insolvency  laws  of  England  were  generally 
considered  to  be  the  most  creditor-oriented  insolvency  laws  of  the 
European  countries.  This  was  mainly  due  to  the  important  role  that 
administrative receiverships fulfilled in the English insolvency system. 
Even  though  the  Insolvency  Act  1986  provided  for  a  reorganization 
regime in the form of the administration procedure, this procedure was 
not often used for such purpose as floating charge holders could veto the 
appointment  of  an  administrator  by  appointing  an  administrative 
receiver.  As  a  consequence,  the English  insolvency  laws were  highly 
creditor-driven  in  character,  as  receiverships  were  ‘private’,  i.e.  not 
collective, procedures effectively realizing the company’s assets to the 
benefit of the floating charge holders. Administrative receiverships were 
                                                       
 
9   11 USC s. 1121(d). After 120 days the exclusivity period is often routinely 
extended. 
 
10   11 USC s. 1128(a). 
 








criticized  for  failing  to  maximize  value  to  the  benefit  of  unsecured 
creditors and for their lack of transparency and accountability to a range 
of  groups  who  were  affected  by  the  receiver’s  decision-making.
12 
Therefore, the Enterprise Act 2002 amended the 1986 Insolvency Act
13 
by  considerably  curtailing  the  possibility  to  appoint  administrative 
receivers.
14 
  A  bankruptcy  regime  that  still  lacks  a  proper  reorganization 
procedure is that of the Netherlands. Under the Dutch Bankruptcy Act, 
firms can choose between a liquidation procedure and a suspension of 
payments  procedure.  The  liquidation  procedure  stays  the  enforcement 
rights of the unsecured creditors and privileged creditors, whereas the 
suspension op payments procedure only stays the enforcement rights of 
the unsecured creditors. In both procedures, secured creditors can still 
enforce their claims against the debtor’s assets except for the possibility 
to request the court to order a stay for a maximum period of two months. 
The distribution in bankruptcy adheres to the absolute priority rule. In 
both  procedures  the  debtor  can  offer  a  composition  to  its  unsecured 
creditors.  In  practice,  the  suspension  of  payments  procedure  mainly 
functions as a doorstep to the liquidation procedure. In order to preserve 
businesses,  mostly  going-concern  asset  sales  out  of  liquidation 
bankruptcy are used.
15 
                                                       
 
12  See  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry,  The  White  Paper,  Productivity  and 
Enterprise: Insolvency—A Second Chance, Cm 5234, (July 2001) at p. 9. 
 
13  For a comprehensive overview of the procedures of the 1986 Insolvency Act 
and  the  amendments  made  to  such  Act  by  the  Insolvency  Act  2000  (implemented  1 
January 2003) and Part 10 of the Enterprise Act 2002 (implemented 15 September 2003), 
see I.F. Fletcher, ‘UK Corporate Rescue: Recent Developments’, 5 European Business 
Organization Law Review (2004) p. 119; also D Prentice, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of 
the Enterprise Act 2002’, 5 European Business Organization Law Review (2004), p. 153. 
 
14  See infra nn. 41 and 42 and accompanying text. 
 
15  For  a  more  extensive  description  of  the  Dutch  bankruptcy  regime,  see  S. 
Franken, ‘Bankruptcy Law and Business Reorganization in the United States and the 
Netherlands’, in: R. Vriesendorp, J.A. McCahery and F. Verstijlen (eds), Comparative 
and International Perspectives on Bankruptcy Law Reform in the Netherlands, (Boom 
Juridische Uitgevers, Den Haag, 2001) pp. 53-97. Another example of a creditor-oriented 
regime  is  the  Swedish  auction-based  insolvency  regime,  see  B.E.  Eckbo  and  K.S. 








  Prior to 1999, the German bankruptcy laws were very similar to those 
of  the  Netherlands.  In  1999,  however,  the  new  Insolvency  Act 
introduced a single gateway to both liquidation and reorganization. The 
reasons for amending the existing laws were the lack of assets available 
for distribution to the (unsecured) creditors and the desire to introduce a 
business reorganization procedure.
16 Under the new Act the enforcement 
rights  of  all  creditors,  including  those  of  the  secured  creditors,  are 
stayed. As a rule management is replaced by a court-appointed trustee. 
Yet  the  court  can  leave  the  debtor’s  management  in  control  of  the 
company, albeit under the supervision of an administrator, provided that 
the debtor has requested so and the continued control by management 
does not harm the creditors’ interests.
17 Creditors rights include a right to 
commission the administrator to make a reorganization plan, and a right 
to  approve  several  important  decisions  such  as  the  liquidation  of  all 
assets,  the  sale  of  the  debtor’s  business  as  a  going-concern,  and  the 
incurring of sizeable loans. 
  Another important difference between Chapter 11 and many of its 
European counterparts is that the plan procedures of the latter are less 
sophisticated,  so  that  they  are  less  apt  for  the  restructuring  of  more 
complex  capital  structures.  Although  the  German  plan  provisions  are 
relatively more sophisticated, they still suffer from important omissions. 
In principle, all unsecured and secured creditors, if affected by the plan, 
                                                                                                                        
Journal of Financial Economics (2003) p. 227. In Finland a reorganization provision has 
been added to the bankruptcy laws in 1993. Yet, this procedure cannot be classified as 
debtor-oriented:  an  administrator  has  to  supervise  the  operations  of  the  debtor,  the 
administrator is closely involved in drafting the reorganization plan, and the stay is not 
automatic, see S.A. Ravid and S. Sundgren, ‘The Comparative Efficiency of Small-Firm 
Bankruptcies:  A  Study  of  the  US  and  Finnish  Bankruptcy  Codes’,  27  Financial 
Management (Winter 1998) p. 28; S. Sundgren, ‘Does A Reorganization Law Improve 
the Efficiency of the Insolvency Law? The Finnish Experience’, 6 European Journal of 
Law and Economics (1998) p. 177. 
 
16  See A. Flessner, ‘National Report for  Germany’, in W. W. McBryde, et al. 
(eds.), Principles of European Insolvency Law (Amsterdam: Kluwer Legal Publishers, 
2003), n. 100 (noting that the most hotly debated issue during the reforms was the extent 
to  which  security  interests  had  to  be  curbed  in  order  to  facilitate  more  effective 
insolvency proceedings). 
 








vote on the plan, and creditors can be divided in classes if their economic 
interests would require so.
18 However, shareholders do not vote on the 
plan,  but  are  also  not  wiped  out  under  the  plan.  As  a  consequence, 
shareholders can still keep some value after plan acceptance even if their 
interests  are  clearly  under  water.
19  A  similar  problem  exists  in  the 
Netherlands, where only unsecured creditors can vote as one class on a 
composition.
20  In  addition,  both  in  Germany  and  the  Netherlands 
separate approval of the shareholders is required if a plan restructures the 
company’s share capital. Moreover, the German plan provisions make a 
debt-for-equity  swap  even  more  complicated  by  requiring  each 
individual  creditor’s  consent  to  a  plan  that  converts  his  claims  to 
shares.
21 
2.2  Ex Ante and Ex Post Efficiencies of Creditor- and Debtor-
Oriented Regimes  
In principle, creditor- and debtor-oriented regimes can be characterized 
by  their  own  tradeoffs  of  efficiencies  and  inefficiencies.  Under  a 
creditor-oriented  regime,  both  shareholders  and  managers  have  a 
tendency to delay bankruptcy filings as shareholders are likely not to 
receive any distribution in bankruptcy and managers inevitably lose their 
jobs.  Such  delays  result  in  over-investment  if  a  redeployment  of  the 
firm’s assets would have yielded a higher value for the assets.
22 If the 
                                                       
 
18   ss. 222 par 1 and 2, 237, 238 InsO. 
 
19   See Flessner, loc. cit. n. 16, at p. 187. 
 
20   For this effect under Dutch law, see Franken, loc. cit. n. 15, at pp. 81-2. 
 
21   s. 230 par 2 InsO. 
 
22   See, e.g., J.E. Stiglitz, ‘Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Corporate Finance: 
Bankruptcies  and  Takeovers’,  3  Bell  Journal  of  Economics  &  Management  Science 
(1972)  p.  458  at  p.  462;  M.H.  Miller,  ‘The  Wealth  Transfers  of  Bankruptcy:  Some 
Illustrative Examples’, 41 Law and Contemporary Problems (1977) p. 39 at pp. 41-2; S. 
Titman, ‘The Effect of Capital Structure on a Firm’s Liquidation Decision’, 13 Journal 
of Financial Economics (1984) p. 137 at p. 145; D.E. Ingbermann, ‘Triggers and Priority: 
An  Integrated  Model  of  the  Effects  of  Bankruptcy  Law  on  Overinvestment  and 
Underinvestment’, 72 Washington University Law Quarterly (1994) p. 1341 at p. 1351; 
A.  Schwartz,  ‘The  Absolute  Priority  Rule  and  the  Firm’s  Investment  Policy’,  72 
Washington University Law Quarterly (1994) p. 1213 at p. 1216; R.K. Rasmussen, ‘The 
Ex  Ante  Effects  of  Bankruptcy  Reform  on  Investment  Incentives’,  72  Washington 








degree of insolvency is very high shareholders may also have a tendency 
to under-invest as the chance that the firm will be restored to solvency is 
very  small.
23  Because  of  shareholders’  limited  liability,  the  downside 
risks of their suboptimal investment behavior are shifted to the higher- 
ranking creditors in the form of lower distributions in bankruptcy. This 
ex ante inefficient investment behavior is, however, traded off against an 
ex post efficiency. Because a creditor-oriented regime does not allow for 
renegotiation  during  bankruptcy,  the  probability  of  ex  post  over-
investment  as  a  result  of  delay  tactics  by  shareholders  ex  post  is 
relatively low. Secured creditors, in turn, have a tendency to push for 
quick liquidations because delays in the filing for bankruptcy negatively 
affect the value of their collateral. This leads to ex post under-investment 
if economically viable firms are liquidated instead of being preserved as 
going-concerns. Moreover, quick liquidations may lower the proceeds 
realized on the assets. However, this inefficiency is traded off against an 
ex ante efficiency. The strict application of the absolute priority rule and 
the  possibility  secured  creditors  have  to  enforce  their  rights  protects 
creditors’  ex  ante  bargained  for  rights.  This  lowers  the  costs  of  debt 
capital for firms in general, which increases the access of firms to debt 
funding and thus may lead to less under-investment by firms outside of 
bankruptcy.  Finally,  the  investment  preferences  of  lower  ranking 
creditors  are  diffuse.  In  the  main,  subordinated  creditors’  and  trade 
creditors’  interests  may  be  aligned  with  the  interest  of  business 
continuation  and,  therefore,  their  investment  incentives  are  similar  to 
those of the shareholders. 
  Under  a  debtor-oriented  regime  the  loss-sharing  rule  opens  the 
possibility for the shareholders to receive a distribution in bankruptcy 
even if the firm does not return to a solvent state. A loss-sharing rule, 
therefore,  increases  ex  ante  efficiency  by  reducing  the  shareholders’ 
incentive to delay bankruptcy filings. Similarly, not ousting management 
in bankruptcy may entice managers to file for bankruptcy at an earlier 
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moment in time. However, this ex ante efficiency is traded off against an 
ex  post  inefficiency.  In  order  to  capture  some  distribution  the 
shareholders and junior creditor classes will have a tendency to protract 
the  renegotiation  process  during  bankruptcy  by  coming  up  with 
optimistic projections of the firm’s going-concern value.
24 Such delays 
may  lead  to  the  inefficient  continuation  of  firms  in  bankruptcy.  The 
downside risks of such over-investment are borne by the higher-ranking 
creditors.
25  Management,  in  turn,  can  pursue  its  own  wealth 
maximization  by  aligning  with  those  shareholders’  and  creditors’ 
interests that favor business continuation over liquidation. Specifically, 
trade creditors may favor continuation during bankruptcy provided that 
they  can  continue deliveries to  the firm against full payment  of  their 
post-petition claims. By lowering the expected return of senior creditors 
in bankruptcy, the complete stay and a loss-sharing rule may affect the 
willingness  of  senior  creditors  to  extend  debt  funding  to  financially 
distressed firms. As a consequence, a loss-sharing rule creates ex ante 
inefficiencies in the form of under-investment if it reduces the access of 
economically viable firms to debt financing. 
  In sum, a creditor-oriented regime may be strong in mitigating both 
ex ante under-investment by protecting the creditors’ ex ante bargained 
for rights and ex post over-investment by not allowing for renegotiation 
during the bankruptcy procedure, whereas it may be weak in curtailing 
both ex ante over-investment by enticing firms to delay their bankruptcy 
filings  and  ex  post  under-investment  by  liquidating  too  many 
economically viable firms. In contrast, a debtor-oriented regime may be 
strong in mitigating both ex  ante  over-investment  by  inducing  earlier 
bankruptcy  filings  and  ex  post  under-investment  by  keeping  more 
healthy firms intact, whereas it may be weak in curtailing both ex ante 
under-investment ex post over-investment by offering a lower degree of 
protection to the creditors’ ex ante bargained for rights and by allowing 
too many economically distressed firms to reorganize respectively. 
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3.  CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY AS A GOVERNANCE MECHANISM  
The  initial  characterization  of  creditor-  and  debtor-oriented  regimes 
provided above suggests that neither regime is clearly more efficient as 
both come  with  their own tradeoffs of efficiencies  and  inefficiencies. 
However, there are two important reasons why this characterization falls 
short of explaining the tradeoffs made by these regimes. First, based on 
the  main  tenets  of  the  principal-agent  theory  the  characterization 
essentially only deals with fully dispersed ownership structures, while 
ignoring other ownership structures. Second, by using law-in-the-books 
templates  it  does  not  consider  other  factors  that  may  affect  the 
comparative  efficiency  of  bankruptcy  regimes.  Thus,  these  arguments 
cause  us  to  reconsider  the  value  of  the  insights  of  the  initial 
characterization on the decision to reallocate control in bad states of the 
world and on the role of corporate bankruptcy law with respect to such 
decision. 
  The manner in which bankruptcy law should deal with the issue of 
control cannot be considered separate from the governance structure of 
firms outside of bankruptcy. In general, the existence of many different 
types  of  firms,  with  many  different  characteristics,  causes  difficulties 
when attempting to classify them. Not only do firms differ at the level of 
concentration  of  their equity ownership,  but  also  their debt structures 
vary from concentrated structures--that rely heavily on relational bank 
financing involving the granting of security interests in a large part of the 
debtor’s assets--to more dispersed debt structures that rely much less, or 
not at all, on relational bank lending and secured debt. As is well-known, 
equity and debt fulfill different roles in the governance of the firm.
26 
Common shareholders invest in the most specialized use of the firm’s 
assets, being their current use. Shareholders together with the manager’s 
control the assets in that the shareholders monitor the management and 
have the residual rights of control that are not allocated to the managers 
on the basis of the corporate contract. Debtholders, on the other hand, 
monitor the alternative uses of the firm’s assets and accordingly hold the 
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residual right of control with respect to these alternative uses. The less 
firm specific the assets are, the higher their redeployment value and the 
more likely the use of concentrated and senior debt. Likewise, the more 
alternative specialized uses there are, the more likely the use of dispersed 
debt structures and junior debt would be.
27 A function of debt, therefore, 
is  to  reveal  important  information  on  the  prospects  of  the  firm  in 
different states of the world by tracking the redeployment value of the 
assets. Moreover, assigning specialized monitoring functions to different 
claimholders  saves  on  monitoring  costs  and  reduces  information 
asymmetry between the different residual claimholders and management. 
In addition to the monitoring function, debt also fulfils a management 
disciplining  function as the  risk of loosing  control to  the  debtholders 
upon default bonds managers to the interests of debtholders by reducing 
their incentives to engage in risky behavior.
28 
  Similarly,  the  reason  for  using  secured  debt  can  be  found  in  the 
monitoring, screening, and bonding functions it fulfills. For one thing, 
secured  debt  prevents  a  duplication  of  monitoring  costs  by  and 
overcomes  a  free-rider  problem  among  debtholders  by  assigning  the 
monitoring function to a single lender.
29 Moreover, by granting security 
interests to creditors specializing in monitoring the redeployment value 
of specific assets, secured debt comes with screening efficiencies.
30 In 
general, specialization among lenders leads to a great variety of security 
arrangements,  which  aim  at  monitoring  different  types  of  assets  or 
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31  For  instance,  lenders  who  finance  the  acquisition  of 
specific types of assets  will generally hold property interests in these 
assets by making use of lease constructions, securitization transactions, 
factoring  arrangements,  or  pledges  in  the  assets  financed.  As  the 
redeployment value of these assets is typically high, the focus of these 
lenders will mainly be on monitoring collateral value. In contrast to the 
security  interests  in  specific  assets,  blanket  security  agreements  force 
lenders to focus on monitoring the cash flows generated by the business 
as a whole as the value of the assets covered by blanket liens fluctuates 
and  may  be  relatively  low.  In  addition,  secured  debt  in  the  form  of 
blanket security arrangements offers lenders leverage over the debtor’s 
business  decisions.  As  the  security  arrangement  allows  the  lender  to 
withdraw vital assets from the business, blanket liens force the debtor to 
cooperate with the lender and thus bond the debtor’s interests to that of 
the  lender.  This  so-called  hostage  effect  empowers  the  lender  to 
influence the debtor’s investment decisions.
32 Moreover, by offering the 
lender a  contingent  right of  control  blanket  liens entice  the lender to 
make  firm-specific  investments  by  providing  valuable  financial 
coordination  and  sharing  expertise  with  the  debtor  in  managing  the 
business. The benefits of such firm-specific investments likely accrue to 
all the debtor’s creditors as they limit risky investment behavior by the 
debtor.
33 
  Returning  to  the  relationship  between  governance  structures  and 
corporate bankruptcy law, the central problem that a firm faces under 
conditions  of  financial  or  economic  distress  is  the  decision  on  the 
reallocation of the residual right of control. In this regard, it is worth 
noting that the residual right of control refers to the possibility to exert 
power over the management of the debtor’s assets with the aim of wealth 
maximization. In general, the reallocation of the residual right of control 
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should be such that it fosters ex ante incentives to make firm-specific 
investments of human and financial capital. The role now of corporate 
bankruptcy law with respect to the reallocation of the residual right of 
control derives from the efficiency with which a firm’s capital structure 
deals with such reallocation decision. This would suggest that corporate 
bankruptcy law only would have to intervene in the governance of the 
firm’s  assets  if  the  firm’s  governance  conditions  are  suboptimal. 
Typically the more complicated capital structures are, the less likely they 
are  to  provide  clear-cut  guidance  ex  ante  on  the  reallocation  of  the 
residual right of control. Likewise, the more specialized alternative uses 
of  the  assets  exist,  the  less  likely  it  will  be  that  there  are  specific 
directives  ex  ante  for  reallocating  residual  control.  Under  these 
conditions,  renegotiation  ex  post  or  the  interference  of  a  third  party 
decision maker may be required in order to reallocate the residual right 
of control. Hence, as the ‘completeness’ of capital structures varies, the 
role  that  corporate  bankruptcy  has  to  fulfill  in  the  governance  of 
financial or economic distress varies accordingly. 
  In order to show the relationship between corporate governance and 
corporate  bankruptcy  law,  the  next  two  sections  will  consider  two 
prototypical  firms  representing  opposite  extremes:  1)  the  small  and 
medium-sized business with a relational secured bank lender, and 2) the 
large publicly-held firm with a dispersed equity and debt structure. With 
respect  to  the  first  firm,  the  contract  with  the  relational  bank  lender 
provides for a mechanism of renegotiation outside of bankruptcy that is 
mutually  beneficial  to  the  debtor  and  the  creditors.  There  is  initial 
evidence on the comparative efficiency of assigning the residual right of 
control  under  conditions  of  insolvency  to  the  relational  bank  lender, 
which evidence suggests that the role of corporate bankruptcy law with 
respect  to  these  firms  is  not  much  more  than  reinforcing  the  power 
exercised by the concentrated secured debtholders. With regard to the 
large  publicly-held  firm,  managers  are  disciplined  by  ex  post  market 
correctives. The reallocation of the residual right of control is thus left 
over  to  open-ended  ex  post  mechanisms.  This  requires  a  bankruptcy 
regime  that  facilitates  efficient  renegotiation  ex  post.  Moreover,  the 
process of resolving financial distress is much more open-ended as it is 








3.1  Small and medium-sized businesses with a concentrated debt 
structure  
The typical small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) is characterized 
by concentrated equity ownership with a shareholder-manager or a small 
group of shareholders owning a substantial part of the shares. Also, it 
may have a long-term lending relationship with one main bank lender. 
Despite the fact that the main bank lender only provides around forty per 
cent of the firm’s debt financing, it nevertheless holds floating and fixed 
security  interests  in a substantial part of the  debtor’s  assets.  Its  trade 
creditors  are  generally  dispersed.  Because  the  interests  of  the 
shareholders  coincide  with  that  of  the  manager-owner,  the  lender-
manager conflict likely dominates in SMEs.
34 
  This type of SME may benefit from the leverage of a concentrated 
secured bank lender. The advantage of the concentrated bank lender’s 
role as monitor of the firm’s economic and financial condition is that 
once  the  firm  is  confronted  with  a  downturn  of  its  fortune  the  bank 
lender  may  require  the  firm  to  take  adequate  restructuring  measures. 
Concentrating the liquidation rights with the relational bank lender by 
granting it security interests in a considerable part of the firm’s assets 
bonds the manager’s interests to that of the relational bank lender by 
effectively placing the power to take the shut-down decision in the hands 
of the bank lender. A hard bankruptcy regime reinforces the monitoring 
and  bonding  functions  of  relational  bank  debt,  by  making  the  bank 
lender’s  threat  power  outside  of  bankruptcy  a  credible  one.  As  a 
consequence,  managers  are  enticed  to  follow  more  conservative 
investment policies that reduce the chance of bankruptcy. Moreover, it 
induces financially and  economically  distressed  debtors  to renegotiate 
their loans and restructure their operations outside of bankruptcy. This is 
efficient as the costs of these out-of-court restructurings are relatively 
low as negotiation only takes place between the debtor and the relational 
bank lender. Furthermore, considering that relational bank lending is an 
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important source of funding for SMEs, reinforcing the relational bank 
lender’s contingent rights of control in bankruptcy induces such lenders 
to make firm-specific investments outside of bankruptcy. To be sure, the 
downside of a hard bankruptcy regime remains that the liquidation sales 
or auctions of the assets in bankruptcy generally depress the prices made 
for  the  assets  and  result  in  low  recovery  rates  for  the  unsecured 
creditors.
35 Yet, these ex post costs--in the form of lower proceeds--need 
to be balanced against the possible higher ex ante benefits resulting from 
the combination of concentrated private bank debt and hard bankruptcy 
regimes. 
  That the ex ante benefits of a bankruptcy regime that enforces the 
leverage of the concentrated secured bank lender may be considerable, is 
evidenced by recent research of Franks and Sussman into the files of 542 
financially distressed SMEs in the UK that were placed in the hands of 
the rescue units of their main bank lenders. Even though in most cases 
the bank provided only 40% of the loans, it nevertheless invariably held 
floating and fixed charges on nearly all the firm’s assets. Consequently, 
it had the right to appoint an administrative receiver.
36 The Frank and 
Sussman  study  shows  that  banks  make  very  limited  concessions,  are 
slow  to  exercise  liquidation  rights  and  rarely  increase  interest-rate 
margins to  compensate for increased default risk.
37  Furthermore, they 
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found that banks usually made the decision to put the firm in bankruptcy, 
while they found little to no evidence that trade creditors entered into 
asset grabbing, creditor runs, litigation or threatening with liquidation to 
enforce  repayment  of  their  debts.  Instead,  trade  creditors  tended  to 
maintain  or  even  expand  lending  during  distress.
38  Even  though  they 
found that banks generally realize high recovery rates on their claims 
while other creditors realize low recoveries suggesting that banks time 
liquidations when the value of the firm equals the value of the bank’s 
collateral, their evidence also suggests that a bank’s decision to liquidate 
a firm is sensitive to a firm’s own restructuring efforts.
39 Their results 
show  that  the  concentrated  bank  lenders’  involvement  in  the 
management of SMEs mainly serves the preservation of going-concern 
value by facilitating restructuring outside of bankruptcy. 
  This  empirical  work  gives  credence  to  the  theory  that  the 
concentrated secured bank lender fulfils an important monitoring role in 
the governance of SMEs and that concentrating liquidation rights with 
the main bank lender mainly serves as a bonding device.
40 These benefits 
also accrue to the unsecured trade creditors, not in the form of recoveries 
in bankruptcy, but in the form of continued trading relationships with the 
businesses  that  are  kept  afloat  outside  of  bankruptcy.  Franks  and 
Sussman’s results challenge the strength of the criticism on the role of 
secured bank lenders in the turn-around of financially distressed SMEs. 
It  also  casts  doubts  on  the  recent  abolition  of  administrative 
receiverships in the UK insofar as it regards their use with respect to 
SMEs.  Under  the  new  UK  Insolvency  Act  qualifying  floating  charge 
holders are precluded from appointing an administrative receiver.
41 In 
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addition, in order to prevent that the proceeds freed up as a result of the 
abolition of the Crown preference would be distributed to the floating 
charge  holder,  a  new  distributive  rule  provides  that  a  part  of  the 
company’s net property has to be made available for the satisfaction of 
the company’s unsecured creditors.
42 The tendency to blame the secured 
creditor for the low recoveries of unsecured creditors in bankruptcy—
which tendency is certainly not unique to the UK
43—overlooks the ex 
ante  efficiency  benefits  that  secured  bank  lending  brings  to  the 
governance  of  SMEs  by  reducing  information  asymmetry  and 
constraining risky investment behavior of debtors. Moreover, pointing to 
the  low  recoveries  of  unsecured  creditors  in  bankruptcy  selectively 
focuses  on  that  part  of  the  SMEs  that  finally ends  up  in  bankruptcy, 
while negating the positive externalities that secured bank debt brings to 
unsecured creditors by timely instigating the restructuring of financially 
distressed and badly managed firms.  
  However,  without  administrative  receiverships  for  floating  charge 
holders  banks  can  continue  to  fulfill  their  role  in  the  governance  of 
SMEs by bargaining for floating charges and fixed charges that together 
cover significant parts of the debtor’s assets. For instance, although the 
Netherlands does not have a floating charge similar to the pre-Enterprise 
Act 2002 floating charge, the pattern of bank financing to SMEs is very 
similar in that SMEs pledge large parts of their assets to their ‘house’ 
bank and, once firms start to experience financial difficulties, the house 
bank generally intensifies its leverage by placing firms under the control 
of special rescue departments. An important characteristic of the Dutch 
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collective  bankruptcy  procedure,  though,  is  that  the  powers  of  the 
secured creditors to enforce their claims in bankruptcy essentially remain 
in tact.
44 Dutch banks contend that bank-led informal restructurings lead 
to the preservation of the business of 75% to 80% of the firms placed 
under the control of their rescue units. In a study of a selection of files 
dealt  with  by  the  rescue  units  of  two  Dutch  banks,  Van  Amsterdam 
found that the success rate of the bank-led out-of-court restructurings 
were lower than banks generally contend, but were nevertheless still high 
enough to suggest that banks play an important role in preserving going-
concern  value  of  SMEs.
45  He  distinguished  between  a  ‘bank  success 
rate’, meaning that the bank receives full payment of its loans, and a 
‘societal success  rate’,  meaning that either (a  part  of) the  business  is 
preserved or, although the business is terminated outside of bankruptcy, 
all its debts are paid in full.
46 Van Amsterdam found that of the 235 files 
of bank one the ‘bank success rate’ was 71%, while the ‘societal success 
rate’ ranged from 55% to 61%. Of the 267 files of bank two the ‘bank 
success rate’ ranged from 72% to 80%, while the ‘societal success rate’ 
ranged from 48% to 57%.
47 
  Together  the  results  of  Franks  and  Sussman  and  van  Amsterdam 
suggest that not only the formal characteristics of a bankruptcy regime 
matter, but also the extent to which the insolvency proceedings reinstate 
the contingent right of control of the relational bank lender. Again if we 
return  to  the  UK,  one  observes  that,  despite  the  abolition  of 
administrative receiverships, qualifying charge holders are still afforded 
the  right  to  directly  appoint  an  administrator  or  to  intervene  by 
appointing  an  administrator  upon  the  receipt  of  a  notice  of  an 
administration  order.
48  These  rights,  which  offer  secured  lenders  the 
possibility to seize control of the administration procedure, may offset 
the  possible  negative  effects  that  the  abolition  of  administrative 
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receiverships  might  otherwise  have  on  the  role  of  bank  control  in 
reducing agency costs.
49 
  Apart from the low recovery rates of unsecured creditors, bank-led 
informal restructurings are criticized for their lack of transparency and 
accountability  to  the  creditors  and  other  interested  parties  that  are 
affected by the bank lenders’  decision making.
50 Given the perceived 
benefits  that  bank  control  may  have  for  SMEs,  the  case  for  more 
transparency  of  the  informal  renegotiations  between  firm  and  bank 
lender seems not a very strong one. For one thing, the informal character 
and  the  secrecy  of  the  renegotiation  process  between  bank  and  firm 
provides for a low cost restructuring process and prevents indirect costs 
in  the  form  of  the  termination  of  trade  credit  and  loss  of  trade.  In 
addition, unsecured creditors benefit from the reduction of suboptimal 
investment  decisions  resulting  from  ex  ante  supervision  by  the  bank. 
Moreover,  to  the  extent  that  trade  creditors  have  accounted  for  the 
possibility  of  zero  recovery  in  bankruptcy  they  may  as  well  be 
indifferent on the issue of transparency. Increasing transparency outside 
of bankruptcy, therefore, is more likely to impose additional costs on the 
firm than add value. To be sure, the conflict between bank lender and 
unsecured  trade  creditors  likely  boils  down  to  the  issue  of  the  bank 
lender’s ‘private benefits of control’. In this, an analogy could be made 
to  the  conflict  between  a  blockholder  and  minority  shareholders  of  a 
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50  See, e.g., Department of Trade and Industry, supra n. 12. In a similar vein, 
criticism on the dominant secured bank lender often focuses on its partiality, by pointing 
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control with respect to SMEs, it also tends to overlook that secured lenders, although not 
formally  in  control  during  bankruptcy,  can  still  exert  power  over  decision-making 








corporation,  where  the  benefits  of  having  a  blockholder  lie  in  the 
reduction of managerial agency costs and the disadvantages in the quasi-
rents that the blockholder may extract from the corporation. Similarly, 
the  conflict  of  interest  between  bank  lender  and  unsecured  creditors 
likely focuses on the question of whether the bank lender has defrauded 
the other creditors through fraudulent transfers of the debtor’s assets or 
preferential payments by the debtor to the bank. To address this issue, 
however, bankruptcy law provides for its own ‘self-dealing provisions’ 
in the form of the avoiding powers. 
  An SME relying heavily on concentrated relational bank lending may 
benefit most from a creditor-oriented regime. With respect to this type of 
firm,  a  creditor-oriented  regime  fosters  ex  ante  out-of-court 
restructuring, and tends to rescue a considerable part of the financially 
distressed firms outside of bankruptcy. The downside of this regime may 
be the undue liquidation of a part of the firms that file for bankruptcy 
and the generally low recoveries of unsecured creditors in bankruptcy. 
Yet,  by  keeping  firms  afloat  outside  of  bankruptcy  ex  ante  bank 
supervision creates positive externalities for trade creditors in the form 
of continued trading opportunities, which may offset the low chance of a 
distribution in bankruptcy. Finally, the risk of ex ante over-investment 
seems to be attenuated as relational bank lenders force distressed firms to 
timely  take  appropriate  restructuring  measures.  Thus,  with  respect  to 
SMEs the ex ante benefits of a creditor-oriented regime may outweigh its 
ex post costs. 
  Turning to the debtor-oriented regime of Chapter 11, theory would 
predict that the availability of such a procedure would be too costly for 
bank controlled SMEs.
51 A soft regime allows managers to opt out of the 
contract with the bank lender by filing for bankruptcy, while enabling 
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Characteristics  of  Businesses  in  Bankruptcy’,  73  American  Bankruptcy  Law  Journal 
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them  to  continue  inefficient  business  operations  in  bankruptcy.  Soft 
regimes would thus weaken the role of the bank as an effective ex ante 
monitor of the debtor’s investment decisions. Thus, providing the option 
of a Chapter 11-like procedure would destabilize the balance struck by a 
hard bankruptcy regime. 
  This  theoretical  prediction  is,  however,  not  supported  by  a  recent 
study of Morrison into the decision making process of bankruptcy judges 
in Chapter 11, at least insofar as the ex post efficiency of Chapter 11 
involving  SMEs  is  concerned.
52  One  of  the  main  outcomes  of  his 
research is that the contention that Chapter 11, and more in particular 
bankruptcy judges, would allow SMEs to avoid liquidation and continue 
inefficient business operations does not appear to hold, as in most of the 
cases  reviewed  the  bankruptcy  judge  rendered  a  shut-down  decision 
during  the  first  five  months  of  the  case.
53  Morrison  found  that  the 
decision-making process of bankruptcy judges generally  only allowed 
firms to exit Chapter 11 if there were indications of significant going-
concern  value.  Important  in  the  decision-making  of  the  bankruptcy 
judges in the district under study was the swift motion practice. Morrison 
found a relationship between slower shut-down decisions and motions of 
debtors for cash-collateral and adequate protection orders. He argues that 
because the secured creditor usually supports these motions they serve as 
an  indication  to  the  bankruptcy  judge  that  both  the  debtor  and  the 
creditor believe that the firm is a viable enterprise.
54 In contrast, motions 
to lift the automatic stay would serve as indications that the business is 
not viable.
55 A limitation, however, of Morrison’s study is that it does 
                                                       
 
52  E.R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision-Making: An Empirical  Study of  Small-
Business  Bankruptcies,  Columbia  Law  School,  The  Center  of  Law  and  Economic 
Studies,  Working  Paper  no.  239,  available  at  Social  Science  Research  Network 
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were owned and managed by a family or small group of investors). 
 
53  Ibid., at pp. 8, 29  (approximately  50%  of all shut-down  decisions  occurred 
within the first three months of the case, and 70% occurred within the first five months). 
 
54  Ibid., at pp. 30-1. 
 








not analyze the impact of capital structure on the decision-making by the 
bankruptcy  judges.  However,  considering  the  fact  that  motions  are 
opportunities for a judge to obtain information on the viability of the 
firm, the advantages of a speedy motion practice lie in the prevention of 
undue delays of the Chapter 11 procedure.
56 By hypothesis, then, the 
extent  to  which  a  debtor-oriented  regime  is  able  to  reinstate  the 
monitoring and informational function of the concentrated secured bank 
lender may depend on the efficiency of the procedure and the possibility 
for secured lenders to intervene at an early stage of the procedure. 
3.2  The  large  publicly-held  firm  with  a  dispersed  ownership 
structure 
At the other end of the continuum, we find the large publicly-held firm 
with  a  pattern  of  dispersed  share  and  debt  ownership.  Information 
asymmetry  exists  between  both  managers  and  shareholders  and 
managers and creditors. This firm uses a variety of lending transactions. 
Typically, a publicly-held firm does not use blanket liens and the use of 
secured debt is restricted to specific assets. Unlike in the case of SMEs, 
secured  debt  does  not  work  as  a  mechanism  to  bond  the  managers’ 
interest to that of the creditors, but mainly functions as a monitor of the 
value of specific assets. Due to the large information asymmetry between 
management  and  claimholders,  information,  and  specifically  ‘bad’ 
information,  tends  to  be  relinquished  to  the  market  with  delay. 
Consequently,  reactions  to  unwanted  managerial  investment  decisions 
have  an  after-the-fact  nature  in  the  form  of  replacement  of  under-
performing  managers  and  hostile  takeovers.  Thus,  in  a  dispersed 
ownership structure shareholders, bondholders, and other creditors are 
weak ex ante monitors of the managers’ investment decisions. 
  Theory  now  suggests  that  a  soft  bankruptcy  regime  would 
complement the governance structure of firms with dispersed ownership 
structures. Because market reactions are typically hard on management, 
the risk exists that managers do not timely signal financial or economic 
problems to the market and thereby postpone restructuring efforts. If the 
bankruptcy regime is hard on management as well, it does not pay off to 
                                                       
 








managers to signal financial distress by filing for bankruptcy. However, 
leaving management in place in bankruptcy as the debtor-in-possession 
would  provide  managers  an  indirect  reward  for  timely  signaling  a 
financial  or  economic  downturn in  the firm’s  fortunes.
57 A  debtor-in-
possession  system  is,  therefore,  said  to  have  information  forcing 
qualities,  which  benefit  dispersed  ownership  structures  by  reducing 
information asymmetry and limiting ex ante over-investment. 
  Another  explanation  for  having  soft  bankruptcy  procedures  is 
fostering efficient renegotiation ex post by reducing transaction costs. 
Firms  that  attract  much  publicly  traded  debt  are  more  likely  to  face 
financial problems in the form of debt overload. Because publicly traded 
bonds are typically unsecured, and the enforcement of their covenants is 
difficult, lenders cannot easily constrain future borrowing. Consequently, 
renegotiation  ex  post  is  required  to  bring  the  level  of  debt  back  to 
manageable  proportions.  Renegotiation  of  complex  capital  structures 
consisting  of  different  layers  of  publicly  traded  equity  and  debt  is, 
however, inherently difficult and produces considerable transaction costs 
that may lead to the break-down of the renegotiation process.
58 First, due 
to free-riding problems among public debtholders renegotiation comes 
with hold-out problems. As a result, out-of-court restructurings of public 
debt are costly and more likely to fail than the restructuring of private 
concentrated  debt.  A  debtor-oriented  bankruptcy  regime  lowers 
transaction costs by providing for majority voting procedures and cram-
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‘Optimal “Soft” or “Tough” Bankruptcy Procedures’, 15 Journal of Law, Economics & 
Organization (1999) p. 659 at pp. 676-7. 
 
58  S.C.  Gilson,  ‘Bankruptcy,  Boards,  Banks  and  Blockholders:  Evidence  on 
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(eds.), Corporate Bankruptcy: Economic and Legal Perspectives, (Cambridge University 








down mechanisms. Second, in order to extract quasi-rents equityholders 
and junior debtholders can use their hold-up power by haggling over the 
value of the firm. Loosening the strict application of the absolute priority 
rule--by providing for a loss-sharing rule--can therefore be viewed as a 
way to lower transaction costs by preventing valuation disputes. 
  A  third,  less  explored  explanation  of  the  relationship  between 
dispersed  ownership  structures  and  debtor-oriented  regimes,  is  the 
incompleteness of capital structures characterized by dispersed share and 
debt ownership and the concomitant need for a mechanism that assigns 
the residual right of control ex post. Essentially, the different layers of 
rights against the firm’s differentiated income streams constitute residual 
rights of control in different states of the world. The senior claimholders 
likely only monitor the value of distinct assets, and not the cash flows of 
the business as a whole. As a consequence, they are ill equipped to take 
the shut-down decision. Even if a few of the senior claimholders would 
be able to take such decision, they do not have the powers to claim their 
residual  right  of  control  of  the  firm’s  investment  decisions.  In  other 
words, the interests of management are not bonded to the interests of a 
single  senior  creditor.  As  a  consequence,  the  conflict  of  interests 
between  junior  claimholders  and  senior  claimholders  dominates  in 
dispersed ownership structures. Under these conditions it becomes very 
difficult, if not impossible, to design a capital structure that provides for 
a mechanism that assigns the residual right of control in bad states of the 
world.  In  other  words,  the  dispersed  ownership  structure  of  the 
prototypical publicly-held firm leaves open to whom the residual right of 
control will be ceded in different states of the world, and mainly leaves 
such  decision  to  open-ended  ex  post  market  processes.  Firms  with 
dispersed  ownership  structures  would,  therefore,  benefit  from  a 
bankruptcy regime that not only facilitates renegotiation ex post, but also 
leaves open the entrance of third party decision makers, who can take up 
the role of exercising, or can facilitate the exercise of, the residual right 
of control. 
  Empirical research on the functioning of Chapter 11 in the cases of 
large  publicly-held  firms  evidences  the  role  that  market  mechanisms 
fulfill ex post in order to facilitate a transfer of control. First, the CEO 








Chapter 11 is remarkably high.
59 Changes of control occur as a result of 
claims  buying  by  investors  with  a  view  on  gaining  control  of  the 
reorganized firms
60, the outright sale of companies during Chapter 11, 
and  the  sale  of  securities  received  by  creditors  under  reorganization 
plans to new investors shortly after plan confirmation.
61 Second, research 
on Chapter 11 cases in the 80s and the early 90s revealed that Chapter 11 
plans  often  distributed  some  value  to  shareholders  and  subordinated 
creditors even though higher ranking creditor classes were not paid in 
full, although on average these distributions were not very high.
62 This 
evidence  not  only  indicates  that  Chapter  11  is  not  exactly  soft  on 
management  and  shareholders
63,  but  also  that  market  mechanisms 
continue to fulfill an important role in the transfer of control. 
  Recently,  several  scholars  have  emphasized  that  over  the  last  few 
years Chapter 11 would have become a speedier procedure relying more 
                                                       
 
59  L.  LoPucki  and  W.C.  Whitford,  ‘Corporate  Governance  in  the  Bankruptcy 
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of Finance (1990) p. 1457, at p. 1463; J.R. Franks and W.N. Torous, ‘An Empirical 
Investigation of US Firms in Reorganization’, 44 Journal of Finance  (1989) p. 747, at p. 
761. 
 
63  Which  takes  the  edge  of  the  argument  that  Chapter  11  would  impose  high 
indirect  costs  on  distressed firms  by  favoring  business  continuation  to  the  benefit  of 
managers and shareholders regardless of the economic viability of the firms. For this line 
of reasoning see, e.g., M. Bradley and M. Rosenzweig, ‘The Untenable Case for Chapter 








heavily  on  asset  sales  and  plans  negotiated  prior  to  bankruptcy.
64 
Analyzing the cases of publicly traded firms that exited Chapter 11 in 
2002, Baird and Rasmussen found that the majority of the cases involved 
asset sales and plans negotiated prior to bankruptcy. Equity holders were 
often wiped out while new investors took control, removed old boards of 
directors  and closed  plants.
65 Market  mechanisms  appear to dominate 
this  ‘new’  Chapter  11.  Investment  bankers facilitate asset sales while 
special  Chapter  11  and  eve-of-bankruptcy  ‘pay-for-performance’ 
packages  link  managers’  compensation to  the  speed  of  reorganization 
cases  and prices obtained  in asset sales.
66  Moreover,  recent  empirical 
research has found that debtor-in-possession lenders (dip-lenders) play 
an  important  role  in  screening  viable  firms,  and  in  monitoring  and 
generating information on the prospects of firms in Chapter 11.
67 
  The observation that Chapter 11 has recently been used for going-
concern  asset  sales  and  the  execution  of  pre-negotiated  plans 
orchestrated by major creditors may point much less to a new trend in 
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in Chapter 11’, 152 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (2003) p. 917, at p. 934. 
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Chapter 11 than to the fact that market mechanisms have an important 
impact on the process of taking control of distressed firms in Chapter 11. 
This observation thus appears to be in line with the theory that in bad 
states of the world the reallocation of the residual right of control takes 
place  ex  post  through  open-ended  market  mechanisms.  Moreover, 
because of the severe asymmetric information problem, there is a need 
for intermediaries that fill the monitoring gap. The role that dip-lenders 
and  investment  bankers  seem  to  play  in  the  turn-around  of  large 
publicly-held  firms  may  evidence  the  existence  of  intermediaries  that 
have  stepped  into  the  monitoring  gap.  In  sum,  Chapter  11  did  not 
become a more creditor-driven procedure, but is, and might always have 
been, a market-driven process. 
  However,  the  process  of  restructuring  large  publicly-held  firms 
through  Chapter  11  has  downside  considerations.  Even  though  the 
chance that reorganization plans are confirmed in large cases may be 
relatively  high  and  the  percentage  offered  to  unsecured  creditors  in 
reorganization  plans  is  generally  higher  than  in  creditor-oriented 
regimes,  the  final  outcome  of  Chapter  11  cases  still  depends  on  the 
extent  to  which  Chapter  11  plans  consummate.  There  is  empirical 
evidence that a part of the corporations emerged from Chapter 11 with 
too much debt in their capital structures, which leads some of them to 
refile for Chapter 11 or liquidate in Chapter 7.
68 Needless to say, in a part 
of the Chapter 11 cases the recovery rates of unsecured creditors will 
thus  be  lower  than  projected  under  the  initial  reorganization  plans. 
Moreover, there is evidence that a considerable part of the firms that 
emerged  from  Chapter  11  underperformed  their  industry  rivals.
69  As 
such, the broad automatic stay keeping the pre-petition creditors at bay 
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as well as the possibility to incur debtor-in-possession loans may enable 
economically distressed firms to prolong their business operations for 
some  time.  As  long  as  a  debtor  generates  enough  cash  flow  during 
Chapter 11 to pay off post-petition trade creditors and lenders it may 
continue  its  operations  regardless  of  the  economic  viability  of  its 
business. Chapter 11 may then be suboptimal in that it postpones the 
shut-down of firms too long. 
With respect to large publicly-held firms, the tradeoffs made by the 
debtor-oriented Chapter 11 appear to be closely related to the tradeoffs 
made in a market-based corporate governance system. A market-based 
corporate  governance  system  is  characterized  by  dispersed  ownership 
structures, liquid  trading  markets,  and the reliance  on ex  post market 
correctives to discipline managers’ investment behavior. Market-based 
systems tradeoff enhanced liquidity against less ex ante supervision of 
management and more debt overhang.
70 The same tradeoff is made by a 
debtor-oriented regime that is used by publicly-held firms with dispersed 
ownership structures. Under these conditions, a debtor-oriented regime is 
strong in curtailing ex ante and ex post under-investment as both outside 
of bankruptcy and inside of bankruptcy firms have enhanced possibilities 
to  attract  additional  funding.  However,  it  is  weak  in  mitigating 
managerial  agency  costs  in  the  form  of  ex  ante  and  ex  post  over-
investment due to its reliance on ex post market correctives both outside 
of  and  inside  of  bankruptcy.  This  trade-off  is  also  reflected  in  the 
recovery of unsecured creditors. On the one hand, unsecured creditors 
benefit from enhanced liquidity, which offers trade creditors increased 
trading possibilities both outside of and inside of bankruptcy and allows 
lenders,  particularly  bondholders,  to  cash  out  on  their  claims  during 
bankruptcy by selling their claims. On the other hand, recovery rates of 
unsecured creditors may on average be lower than initially projected in 
reorganization plans as a part of the firms has to restructure again within 
a few years after they left Chapter 11 for the first time. 
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The  foregoing  analysis  raises  the  question  of  whether  a  debtor-
oriented  bankruptcy  regime would  also  be  a logical  complement  to a 
blockholder-based  system  of  corporate  governance.
71  As  such, 
concentrated  share  ownership  structures  come  with  the  risk  that  the 
blockholder’s and managers’ interests coalesce. Again, the answer to this 
question  may  hinge  on  the  level  of  concentration  of  debt  ownership. 
Publicly-held firms of which the capital structure is characterized by the 
existence of a dominant blockholder and concentrated relational lenders, 
as well as firms with dispersed equityholders and concentrated relational 
bank  lenders,  may  have  greater  affinity  with  creditor-oriented 
bankruptcy  regimes.  In  the  event  these  firms  experience  financial  or 
economic distress bank lenders start to play a pivotal role in the ex ante 
supervision  of  management.  A manager-displacing  bankruptcy regime 
reinforces  the  leverage  of  the  concentrated  bank  lenders  by  forcing 
managers to co-operate with the bank lender. This, in turn, fosters bank-
led out-of-court restructurings. In line with this theory, Armour, et al. 
found that the existence of a creditor-oriented regime in England, where 
share  ownership  in  publicly-held  firms  could  be  characterized  as 
dispersed,  could  be  explained  on  the  basis  of  the  prevalence  of 
concentrated debt structures in the form of a few relational bank lenders 
acting  together  in  a  syndicate.
72  By  means  of  the  so-called  ‘London 
Approach’, developed by the Bank of England, these bank lenders use 
their own ‘privatized’ process of restructuring the debt overload of large 
U.K.  companies.
73  In  firms  with  dispersed  share  ownership  and 
concentrated relational bank lenders, shareholders may benefit from the 
leverage of the bank lenders, as they fill the monitoring gap between 
dispersed  shareholders  and  management.  Creditor-oriented  regimes, 
therefore,  better  complement  concentrated  debt  structures,  mainly 
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because  hard  regimes  reinforce  the  role  of  concentrated  relational 
lenders.  This  is in  line  with  the  idea  that in capital structures  with a 
dominant relational lender the process of assigning the residual right of 
control in conditions of financial and economic distress may already be 
embedded in the firm’s capital structure. These capital structures may, 
therefore, tradeoff enhanced ex ante supervision of management and less 
debt overhang against less liquidity. 
4.  IMPLICATIONS FOR BANKRUPTCY POLICY  
The  foregoing  analysis  holds  out  a  number  of  implications  for 
bankruptcy  policy.  The  relationship  between  corporate  governance 
structures  and  bankruptcy  regimes  implies  that  neither  in  the  United 
States nor in Europe a one-size-fits-all bankruptcy regime exists. Before 
proposing reforms to the bankruptcy laws that could potentially interfere 
with the governance structures of firms, lawmakers should recognize that 
private parties or the market are sometimes better decision makers than 
courts or ‘disinterested’ third parties. More specifically, with respect to 
the  type  of  SMEs  considered  in  this  paper  the  concentrated  secured 
lender is not the problem, but is part of the corporate bankruptcy regime-
corporate  governance  equation.
74  Constraining  the  secured  lender’s 
rights to enforce its security in bankruptcy without offering an escape 
route, which allows relational lenders to take control over the bankruptcy 
process, may counteract the benefits that a relational lender as ex ante 
monitor of distressed firms could bring to both debtors and the other 
creditors.  Thus,  with respect  to  these  firms  there  may  be  no  need  to 
change to a debtor-oriented regime. 
As such, having a debtor-oriented regime seems no necessity if firms 
with concentrated debt structures dominate a country’s firm population. 
Yet, whether or not the introduction of a debtor-oriented regime would 
be counterproductive in countries in which concentrated debt structures 
dominate may depend on the efficiency of the judicial process and on the 
level  of  protection  of  the  rights  of  secured  creditors.  Just  labeling  a 
bankruptcy procedure  as debtor-oriented on the basis of a law-in-the-
books template is not sufficient to determine whether it will only have 
                                                       
 








the  effects  of  a  debtor-oriented  regime,  or  whether  it  could  also 
supplement  the  governance  structures  of  firms  with  concentrated 
ownership  structures,  more  particularly  with  concentrated  debt 
structures. A debtor-oriented regime is too often depicted as a regime 
that would indiscriminately compromise creditors’ rights to the benefit 
of debtors and shareholders, while barring the possibility for creditors to 
intervene  in  the  bankruptcy process. Yet  the  functioning  of  a  debtor-
oriented regime may also depend on other characteristics, such as the 
level  of  protection  of  (secured)  creditors’  rights,  the  swiftness  and 
efficiency  of  the  bankruptcy  procedure,  and  the  possibility  for 
concentrated relational lenders to continue to influence decision-making 
in bankruptcy. By hypothesis, then, debtor-oriented bankruptcy regimes 
can  function  as  creditor-oriented  regimes  with  respect  to  firms  with 
concentrated debt structures if they adequately protect secured creditors’ 
rights and the bankruptcy procedure is responsive to the informational 
and monitoring role of concentrated relational lenders. 
It  may  need  to  be  emphasized  that  the  position  of  senior  secured 
creditors is generally well protected in Chapter 11. Reorganization plans 
must either offer secured creditors full payment or reinstate their claims, 
including  their  security  interests.  Moreover,  the  debtor-in-possession 
needs  to  offer  secured  creditors  adequate  protection  of  their  security 
interests. Not providing for such protection gives a secured creditor the 
right  to  request  a  lift  of  the  automatic  stay.  In  addition,  much  may 
depend  on  the  possibility  that  creditors  have  in  an  early  stage  of  a 
bankruptcy procedure to move to and be quickly heard by the bankruptcy 
judge. In this way, creditors can form an important source of information 
for  the  bankruptcy  judge.  As  a  result,  the  efficiency  of  the  judicial 
process in combination with the design of the bankruptcy laws may be 
sufficient  to reinstate  the  role  of  the  concentrated  bank  lender  in  the 
governance of SMEs or other firms with concentrated debt structures. 
However,  the  efficiency  of  the  judicial  system  differs  among 
jurisdictions. In the main, the level of enforcement of creditors’ rights 
may  be  less  uniform  in  Europe  than  in  the  US.  In  weaker  judicial 
systems that offer a lower degree of protection of creditors’ rights in 








therefore, come with a higher risk of unwanted effects, as it weakens the 
rights of creditors vis-à-vis their debtors even more.
75 
  With respect to Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, the 
relationship  between  corporate  bankruptcy  and  corporate  governance 
teaches  that  the  failure  of  fully  dispersed  ownership  structures  to 
effectively assign the residual right of control in different states of the 
world means that the optimal bankruptcy reaction cannot be cast from an 
ex ante time perspective. As a consequence, Chapter 11 offers a rather 
open-ended  bankruptcy  procedure  that  facilitates  the  continued 
functioning  of  market  processes  to  reallocate  control  over  the  firm’s 
assets. Nonetheless, auction regimes, contingent  equity regimes and  a 
contract  approach  to  corporate  bankruptcy  have  been  proposed  as 
alternatives to Chapter 11. Mandatory auctions have been presented as 
outright repeals of Chapter 11.
76 Contingent equity schemes propose to 
design capital structures in such a way that lower ranking classes can 
obtain a stake in the reorganized firm by buying out their proportionate 
share in the higher ranking classes.
77 The contract approach to corporate 
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bankruptcy law suggests that debtors and lenders should be allowed to 
contract ex ante on the applicable bankruptcy regime.
78 In essence, under 
all  three  approaches  firms  would  choose  ex  ante  for  one  particular 
bankruptcy regime, while leaving out the applicability of other options. 
Even though due to the continued market activity in and around large 
Chapter 11 cases auctions may turn out to be relatively successful in 
these  cases,  and  in  some  cases  the  buy-out  process  suggested  by 
contingent  equity  schemes  could  be  applied  in  the  framework  of  a 
reorganization  plan,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  propriety  of  these 
bankruptcy regimes can be predicted from an ex ante time perspective. 
The incompleteness of dispersed ownership structures suggests that the 
choice for the more optimal bankruptcy reaction cannot be made ex ante, 
but  instead  requires  mechanisms  that  foster  efficient  reallocations  of 
control ex post. It follows that repealing the open-ended debtor-oriented 
regime in relation to firms with dispersed ownership structures by a more 
rigid  bankruptcy  regime  could  potentially  impede  the  efficient 
reallocation of control ex post. 
The foregoing suggests that ‘privatized’ bankruptcy, in the sense that 
a  firm’s  capital  structure  implicitly  includes  an  ex  ante  choice  for  a 
bankruptcy regime, more likely relates to firms with concentrated debt 
structures, whereas such ex ante choice seems not to be embedded in 
capital  structures  of  firms  with  dispersed  ownership  structures.  This 
implies that the possibility for firms to make an ex ante efficient choice 
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for a specific bankruptcy regime may be limited to firms that have a 
capital structure that already includes an implicit bankruptcy choice.
79 
5.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has shown that the comparative efficiency of the creditor- and 
debtor-oriented bankruptcy regimes cannot be viewed separate from the 
governance  structures  of  firms.  Relating  creditor-  and  debtor-oriented 
bankruptcy  regimes  to  the  governance  structures  of  firms  leads  to  a 
revision  of  the  tradeoffs  that  are  often  used  to  characterize  the 
comparative  efficiency  of  both  regimes.  Instead  of  providing  for 
offsetting efficiencies in general, creditor- and debtor-oriented regimes 
essentially offer optimal bankruptcy regimes for different types of firms. 
This is not to say that the complementarities that exist between corporate 
bankruptcy  regimes  and  governance  structures  constitute  first-best 
solutions.  To  be  sure,  bankruptcy  regimes  that  complement  corporate 
governance structures of firms also come with their downsides and can 
be  best  characterized  as  second-best  solutions  in  an  imperfect  world. 
However,  it  may  be  difficult  to  draft  a  bankruptcy  framework  that 
performs better than these second-best solutions. 
At least two implications follow from the analysis provided in this 
paper. First, the reformulation of the tradeoffs made by creditor-oriented 
regimes in relation to SMEs suggests that there is no evident need to 
change  these  regimes  with  a  view  to  enhancing  the  possibilities  for 
business reorganization. Yet, by hypothesis a high level of protection of 
creditors’  rights  in  general  in  combination  with  a  debtor-oriented 
bankruptcy procedure that is responsive to the governance structure of 
SMEs may have a positive impact on the comparative efficiency of a 
debtor-oriented regime. This hypothesis raises additional questions for 
comparative corporate bankruptcy law. For instance, does Chapter 11 in 
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the  case  of  small  firm  bankruptcies  allow  concentrated  secured  bank 
lenders  to  continue  to  fulfill  an  important  informational  role  and, 
thereby,  influence  bankruptcy  decision-making?  Will  the  recent 
amendments to English insolvency law turn out to have a limited effect 
on the role of the concentrated bank lender in the resolution of financial 
distress, now that the concentrated lender may still influence bankruptcy 
decision-making by using its rights to appoint an administrator? Does the 
introduction  of  bankruptcy  procedures  aiming  at  business  rescue  in 
jurisdictions  that  until  recently  had  creditor-oriented  regimes  have  an 
impact on the role of concentrated relational bank lenders in the turn-
around of insolvent businesses? 
Second, the comparative advantage of a debtor-oriented regime with 
respect to the large publicly-held firm that functions in a market-based 
system  mainly  lies  in  the  continued  functioning  of  ex  post  market 
correctives. The open-ended character of Chapter 11 in combination with 
a  continued  functioning  of  the  market  for  corporate  control  seems  to 
provide for a mechanism to reallocate the residual right of control ex 
post  if  a  firm’s  capital  structure  does  not  provide  for  an  ex  ante 
mechanism to effect such change of control. This, however, also limits 
the comparative efficiency of a debtor-oriented regime to market-based 
corporate governance systems. This  posits  the  question of whether in 
blockholder-based  systems, such  as  can  be  found  on  the continent of 
Europe, debtor-oriented bankruptcy regimes have any advantages. The 
analysis in this paper only briefly touched on publicly-held firms with 
concentrated  debt  structures  by  suggesting  that  concentrated  debt 
structures have an affinity with creditor-oriented regimes. In particular, it 
did  not consider at length  the  relationship between  blockholder-based 
corporate  governance  structures  and  bankruptcy  regimes.  Nor  did  the 
analysis  consider  the  relationship  between  bankruptcy  regimes  and  a 
blockholder-dominated firm with a dispersed debt structure. These and 
other ownership structures, however, raise additional questions on the 
proper  relationship  between  corporate  bankruptcy  law  and  corporate 
governance, which will be addressed in subsequent work. 